A Summary of Rowan Williams’ book Why Study the Past
In his book Why Study the Past?, Rowan
Williams shows us how we can study “church history as a spiritual discipline,
not only a critical or scientific one” (110). The point of this spiritual
discipline? Unity with our brothers and sisters in Christ across time and
space.
This unity is a full-bodied and
multi-faceted unity, however, involving all the ambiguity, unknowability and
familiarity of the strongest of human relationships. But the fundamental nature
of this unity is that it is God-given: “Christian theology celebrates a divine
stranger who creates a common world; and in so doing it establishes once and
for all the possibility of a humanity that does not depend for its harmony on
any transient human alliance or definitions of common interest or common
purpose” (114). Rather than setting up criteria for unity to clarify our
relationship with past Christians, our unity is given to us insofar as we have
all been called upon originally by God. This divine initiative stands outside
us and constitutes us. This is why the oneness of Christians in the body of
Christ cannot be artificially constructed. To construct it with outward forms
or inward assents to beliefs is exclusive both to other Christian groups (who
happen to fall outside the particular criteria) and the strangeness in ourselves.
Thus the challenge of writing the
history of the Church Christianly “is to trace the ways in which the
Church has demonstrated its divine origin” (2). This is not just found in
accuracy of doctrinal statements, moral standards, liturgical purity, etc.
Christianity’s divine origin shines through in strange ways. The church
historian must be prepared to be surprised by the past, then, at the same time
as attempting to understand the past as part of his own history and
self-identity.
This ambivalence to the past has
been active within the Church as long as it has existed: thinking through the
question of its connection to Judaism and the Event of Jesus Christ, the Church
knew “the strange and interruptive has to be made into a unity, has to be made
intelligible, yet not reduced and made so smooth that you don’t notice there is
a problem” (9). Though the predominate movement in the Christian tradition –
the movement that met the challenge of those we know call “heretics” – has been
directed by the desire to “re-establish vision of the universe and its
history that made one story, one system” (41), it could only do so by,
paradoxically, including something that was outside it. This strangeness is
integral to the Christian identity.
In this way, Church history
necessarily involves “the attempt to define the very subject whose history is
being attempted” (23). The scope of the identity of the Church determines the
scope of the history. By reiterating again and again the need for an
inclusivity of strangeness, Williams seems to imply that, to some extent, the
best church history is that with the widest scope, for it gives a “sense of who
we now are that is subtle enough to encompass the things we don’t fully
understand. Just as, in a good analysis of an individual self, we emerge with a
heightened awareness of the strangeness within, so with history” (24). Church
history is directly related to self-understanding, and self-understanding is
directly related to our relation with Otherness. With bad history, “we have no
way of understanding where and who we are because we do not allow our ways of
being and thinking to be made strange to us by the serious contemplation of
other ways of being and thinking” (24).
All this means that through the
spiritual discipline of church history, we are made aware of a deeper unity
with past Christians than we thought possible, a sense of unity that heightens
our own self-awareness because (a) the past Church is the present Church: “the
Christian past is unavoidably part of the Christian present” (28); and (b) the
past church is a stranger to the present Church.
This then is the value of church
history: dialogue and unity. “If all serious history drives us finally, as I
think it does, to recognize that some sort of conversation is possible across
surprisingly wide gaps in context and understanding, the same is true far more
profoundly for the Christian, for whom such a conversation is the sign of
belonging in one network of relations, organize around the pivotal relation with
Jesus and his relation with God, into which Christians are inducted” (29). When
this discipline is performed well, it will begin with the awareness that “what
we are attending to is the record of encounter with God in Christ” (28).
This spiritual discipline, like
all others, requires work. However, it is a labour that calls to us from within
us, since we and our history are one. It is, then, “self-motivating.” Williams
stresses that “God revealed [] himself in such a way as not to spare us labour;
God speaks in a manner that insists we continue to grow in order to hear… So
much of our debate can actually be an evasion of labour. And accepting the
labour of having to live with a history that insists upon our involvement is
one of the challenges of believing not only a revealed religion but in one that
sees each of us indebted to all” (112). Christianity calls us to all kinds of
responsibility, and one thing that William has done best in his books is
articulate Christianity’s call to action that presupposes the reality of
history.
What does this mean for the
present? In discovering our unity with the past Church, we rediscover our
identity and in it what makes us distinct from those “idolatrous claims of
total power that may be made from time to time in the world” (58). To
participate in the unity of Christ’s body, then, involves struggling in our own
time towards an awareness of our separate identity, which is defined by “the
difference that is made by the priority of what God does, the action of God in
establishing his authority through the events of Christ’s life, death and
resurrection” (59). Our sine
qua non is this difference.
Here are Williams’ challenging words: “An innovation is proposed; and the
question about it should not be, ‘Is this a step towards an uncontroversial
modernising of faith and practice, a step towards ‘inclusion’ or ‘pluralism’?’
but, ‘Is this something without which we could not, in the long run, make sense
of the commitments that makes sense of martyrdom?’ Or: an innovation is resisted;
and the question should not be, ‘Is this alien to our habits of
interpretation?’ but, ‘Is this going to make it impossible to make sense of the
Christian claim to an independent citizenship?’” (56-57).
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